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Abstract 
Interest in research on heroism has begun to increase during the past 
decade, but, despite the ancient roots of heroism embedded deeply in cultures 
around the world, empirical work on the subject is relatively sparse. Direct and 
explicit empirical study of heroism in organizational contexts, specifically, is 
especially rare. The lack of organizational heroism research is surprising. There is 
a preponderance of evidence that organizational wrongdoing is observed across 
many organizations, sometimes to great extremes that are in violation of federal 
law, and it can have profound social impact. Organizational members who 
become aware of extreme wrongdoing committed by others are likely to 
experience negative cognitive and emotional states. Such states may require 
innocent organizational members who are aware of wrongdoing committed by 
others to engage in courageous, risky, and self-sacrificial behaviors in an effort to 
expose and end misconduct, often without any external benefit for taking action. 
These courageous actors are often heroic. Although a better understanding of 
heroic decision-making in organizations has the potential to curtail organizational 
and larger societal harm, no measurement instrument exists to assess the heroic 
cognitions of organizational members that may predict the likelihood that they 
will engage in heroic behaviors. In response to this gap in the literature, the 
present research sought to develop and explore the dimensionality of a measure of 
heroic cognition for workplace contexts. Using principal axis factoring for 
exploratory factor analysis with oblique factor rotation, four factors were 
extracted, accounting for 27.46% of the variance. After dropping the fourth factor 
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of no theoretical import, and the third factor due to low internal reliability, two 
factors remained: heroic self-efficacy and acceptance of self-sacrifice. Formal 
content validation with a jury of social psychological SMEs, however, failed 
across all items in the retained factors. Potential item content confounds, lengthy 
and complex item wording, and the direct assessment of single-method self-
reported heroic cognitions limited both the interpretability of the results and the 
utility of the scale for future research. Future research should further develop 
measures of the retained heroic self-efficacy and acceptance of self-sacrifice 
scales to circumvent the issues cited by the content validation panel. Initial 
construct validation studies using the revised scales should borrow methodologies 
from the change-oriented organizational citizenship behaviors literature, using a 
multi-trait multi-method approach that seeks to develop a nomological network 
for workplace heroic cognition. The present research provides the foundation for 
more targeted follow-up research efforts on heroic decision-making in 
organizations. 
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Introduction 
Organizational wrongdoing is both prolific and impactful. Nearly every 
organization has reported workplace deviance (Henle, Giacalone, & Jurkiewicz, 
2005), and as many as three of every four employees have engaged in some form 
of deviant workplace behavior, from unscheduled absenteeism, to computer fraud, 
theft, sabotage, or vandalism (Robinson & Bennett, 1995). The cost organizations 
pay for deviance is considerable. On average, the mean financial expense of 
deviant and fraudulent acts is approximately 5% of organizations’ annual revenue 
(ACFE, 2010). Given the United States of America’s GDP for 2012 (National 
Income and Product Accounts, 2013), this amounts to an annual failure-of-
vigilance “tax” of approximately $784 billion across domestic organizations. 
Although most deviant behaviors may be mild in scope (e.g., unscheduled 
absence for a single day of work), the cumulative effect is worthy of attention.  
Occasionally, individual and group acts of deviance themselves command 
attention. Cases of mass-scale organizational fraud, corruption, and criminality 
appear frequently in the media and are pervasive across every type of 
organization. In the business arena, Bernie Madoff’s Ponzi scheme alone cost 
unwitting investors billions of dollars and endured for more than a decade 
(Henriques, 2009). In the public sector, the international image of the United 
States was tarnished when detainees in the Abu Ghraib military prison were 
subjected to demeaning and inhumane treatment by members of the US military 
(Blau, Franco, & Zimbardo, 2009). Even in nonprofit institutions of learning, we 
see cases of people like Diederik Stapel, from our own field of psychology, who 
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committed research fraud in as many as 55 papers to help him achieve 
publications (Enserink, 2010; Neuroskeptic, 2012; Cooper, 2013).  
With such startling prevalence across every genre of work, there is a need 
to combat destructive organizational wrongdoing. Often, however, the punitive 
systems that reprimand wrongdoing and wrongdoers are unaware of a problem 
until courageous organizational members rise to the occasion to expose it. The 
literature has long-recognized such heroic individuals (Nader, Petkas, & 
Blackwell, 1972; Miceli & Near, 1985; Miceli, Near, Rehg, & Van Scotter, 2012), 
but has only recently begun to better understand the antecedents of the choice to 
act against perceived wrongdoing (Miceli, Near, & Dworkin, 2008). Explicit 
research on heroic action in organizations is exceedingly sparse. Especially given 
the vision of tomorrow’s business leaders for an evolved socioeconomic model 
(The Deloitte Millennial Survey, 2014), and the call to create and foster more 
ethical values, pro-social conduct, and effective organizational outcomes 
(Lefkowitz, 2005), further work is needed on the application of moral and selfless 
decision-making paradigms (e.g., Walker, Frimer, & Dunlop, 2012) to the 
workplace. 
The proposed research is an effort to refine the manner in which 
psychologists study heroic behavior in the workplace. To-date, heroism has been 
conceived of as a behavioral outcome of individual traits (e.g., Hughes-Hallet, 
2004) and contextual influence (e.g., Miceli & Near, 1985), but there have been 
few empirical attempts to explicitly define the heroic decision-making process.  It 
has been suggested that heroic imagination, heroic cognition that includes 
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“awareness of opportunities to voluntarily act in self-sacrificing ways for the 
greater good,” may be the distinct psychological construct of interest (Heroic 
Imagination Project, Blau, Franco, & Zimbardo, 2009); however, no attempt has 
been made to develop or test a direct empirical measure of heroic cognitions.  
Optimizing the operationalization and predictability of heroic cognition may 
improve our capacity to combat organizational fraud and deviance. The proposed 
research, therefore, will attempt to develop and validate a scale of heroic 
cognition for use in workplace contexts.  
Heroism Literature Review 
 The concept of heroic behavior is a complex and contentious topic in the 
literature (Blau, Franco, & Zimbardo, 2011). Its operationalization and 
categorization is often grounded more in folklore than in science, initially derived 
primarily from literary legend and historical figures. The traditional view of 
heroism relies on the identification of exemplars that demonstrate face-valid 
heroic behaviors, actions, and qualities. Via written and oral tradition, examples 
of heroes (e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr., Ghandi, FDR, medal of honor 
recipients,…etc.) become comparison cases by which individuals decide whether 
their own actions or those of others witnessed in the media, for instance, are 
heroic (Medin, 1989, p.1472-1473). This view postulates that there exists a 
“Heroic Elect” that, by virtue of exceptional gifts/abilities, are empowered to act 
heroically (Hughes-Hallet, 2004).  
The traditional exemplar categorization of heroes, while conceptually 
useful, requires synthesis and integration in order to render it suitable for 
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empirical exploration. Recent conceptual arguments in the literature have 
suggested that heroic behavior has certain universal characteristics that apply 
across heroic contexts (e.g., Becker & Eagley, 2004; Franco, Blau, & Zimbardo, 
2011; Rankin & Eagley, 2008). Heroic actions in diverse situations all share the 
following characteristics (Franco, Blau, & Zimbardo, 2011). 
(1) The act must be voluntary. 
(2) The act must involve potential physical risk or profound social 
sacrifice. 
(3) The actor must be willing to accept the consequence(s) of her or his 
action. 
(4) The act must be in the service of others and performed without 
expectation of extrinsic gain. 
 
 These general characteristics of heroism can be observed in all heroic 
subtypes within the recently-proposed heroism taxonomy (Franco, Blau, & 
Zimbardo, 2011, p.102). Heroic behavior can be broadly classified in one of two 
general categories based upon the genre of potential jeopardy in which individuals 
may find themselves by choosing to act. An individual who acts heroically may 
either face physical peril, social sacrifice, or both. Although the subtypes of 
heroic action are numerous (twelve in total), all may be found in organizational 
contexts. 
 Heroic subclasses are not mutually exclusive within the specified 
taxonomy (Franco, Blau, & Zimbardo, 2011, p.102), but still provide some 
conceptual utility. Physical peril heroes may be military/duty-bound individuals 
that go above and beyond the call of duty, or civil heroes that choose to act 
despite the lack of formal duty-binding rules. Social sacrifice heroes may be 
labeled in one or more of ten subclasses, including bureaucracy heroes and 
7 
whistleblowers, religious, politico-religious, and political leaders, Good 
Samaritans, underdogs, martyrs, adventurers/discoverers, and scientific heroes. It 
is notable that social sacrifice heroes of any category may also be exposed to 
physical peril (e.g.- assassination attempts, murder threats,…etc) for the work 
they do in the social sphere. Nevertheless, because the five principles of heroic 
behavior apply across all subtypes, the taxonomy functions primarily to provide 
the specific contexts within which a heroic actor will encounter distinct barriers to 
action.  
Given the operationalization of heroic behavior and specification of heroic 
subtypes, it follows that heroic cognition must encompass an awareness of what is 
required to act heroically. Although heroic cognition requires a state of mental 
readiness to act pro-socially and self-sacrificially, there has been no attempt to 
create a measure to assess individual readiness for heroic action. The very limited 
body of literature suggests that it may be four-dimensional (Franco, Blau, & 
Zimbardo, 2011). More specifically, heroic cognition has been conceived of as (1) 
Specific self-efficacy in one’s ability to achieve pro-social goals in a particular 
situational context, (2) Conscious awareness of the situations that should compel 
one to take action for an ethical cause and the situations that should not 
(recognition of boundary conditions), (3) Acknowledgment of barriers to success 
should action be chosen, (4) The courageous acceptance of personal sacrifices that 
may result if action is taken.  
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Heroic Cognition: Related Constructs and Antecedents 
Heroic cognition is likely to be a higher-order factor, related to other 
similar constructs and predicted by individual difference antecedents (Franco, 
Blau, & Zimbardo, 2011). Inherent to the construct is empathic awareness of 
others’ plight, a sense of voluntary duty to meet others’ needs in a pro-social way, 
readiness to promptly respond to needs, courageous acceptance of the potential 
for self-sacrifice required by the choice to act, and the confidence that action may 
produce desired change. The literature already contains some operationalizations 
that are highly-relevant to the above factors: proactivity, altruism and concern for 
others, and specific self-efficacy. 
Proactivity. The heroism literature has arrived at a critical moment in the 
history of world economies. The economic landscape is becoming more 
challenging, and organizational members must often bear the brunt of it. There is 
evidence to suggest that the modern economy demands more of employees than 
ever before (Parker & Ohly, 2008).  Agents of change in the world of work 
include globalization, increasing pace of business, increasing competition in the 
marketplace, increasing education of employees, market instability, and rapidly-
fluctuating organizational resources (Boswell, Colvin, & Darnold, 2008).  A 
“New Deal” psychological contract has arisen, in which employees have often 
become temporary “partners” of organizations, rather than long-term “members of 
the family” as in the paternalistic organizations of the past (Parker & Ohly, 2008).  
Under this new psychological contract, organizations must demand a new 
standard of workers. Employees now have less-defined job roles and titles, and 
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often do the duties that once were assigned to two, three, or more people. Work is 
more socially demanding, more emotionally laborious, and more cognitively 
taxing, requiring employees to be better self-regulators of their cognitions, affect, 
and behaviors (Frese & Fay, 2001; Boswell et al, 2008; Parker & Ohly, 2008).  
Employees of today must use self-regulation tactics to rise to the novel demands 
posed by the New Deal psychological contract of the modern working world, a 
chief demand of which is engaging problematic organizational policies. 
Prompted by an earlier article that introduced the concept (Bateman & 
Crant, 1993), a promising vein of research has developed over the past 15 years 
concerning the need for self-regulation of initiative at work, known as the 
construct proactivity (Parker, Wall, & Jackson, 1997; Parker & Sprigg, 1999). 
Recognizing the dissolution of the more traditional system of narrowly-defined 
job titles and descriptions, Parker and colleagues’ research over the past decade 
has examined whether proactive personality predisposes employees to be more 
successful in increasingly challenging and dynamic workplaces. Generally, 
research has affirmed that proactivity is an important trait for successful 
employees to possess, and has numerous desirable individual and organizational 
outcomes (Parker & Sprigg, 1999; Parker, Bindl, & Strauss, 2010).   
  While reasons for choosing to act proactively at work are infinitely varied, 
the challenges posed by both informal and formal rules and regulations that fail to 
meet the needs for which they were intended may be among the most important 
reasons. As many of us find our work roles within the organizations that employ 
us integral to our self-concept (Super, 1951; Erikson, 1959; Galinsky & Fast, 
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1966), organizational and business rules and regulations are likely to be quite 
salient to many of us in determining our behaviors and the behaviors of those 
around us throughout much of our lives.  Coupled with the understanding that the 
modern economy demands skillful self-regulation, situational work cues may 
persuade some employees to believe that the burden of deviance (positive or 
destructive) from a stagnant or malignant norm falls to themselves, as individuals 
seeking a better outcome than that which the rules provide.  
Altruism and Concern for Others. There has been some criticism that 
heroic cognition is not conceptually distinct in theory from altruism (Eagly, & 
Becker, 2005; Shepela et al., 1999), prompting a thorough response article that 
clarifies the differences between the constructs (Franco, Blau, & Zimbardo, 
2011). Altruistic and heroic behaviors do have some overlap on three dimensions. 
Both are performed voluntarily, without expectation of extrinsic gain, and in the 
service of others.  
Concern for others (Simon, 1990) is likely an antecedent of both altruistic 
and heroic behaviors. Organizational members whose value systems include 
strong other-oriented values are more likely to forgo a preeminent interest in their 
own personal outcomes, instead directing their behaviors towards helping and 
coordinating with others (Korsgaard, Meglino, & Lester, 1997). Even when 
helping others requires that organizational members engage in extra-role 
behavior, adding to the workload of their required job duties, individuals high in 
other-oriented values are still more likely to choose to help others than focus on 
their own personal outcomes (McNeely & Meglino, 1994; Korsgaard, Meglino, & 
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Lester, 1997). Although both altruistic and heroic behaviors are predicated upon 
concern for others, heroic behaviors have a far higher risk threshold for action.  
To be heroic, one must recognize that self-sacrifice, even the greatest 
sacrifice of one’s life itself, may well be a necessary correlate of taking action. 
Furthermore, heroic actors often endure ridicule or status as outcasts and targets 
for their actions, while altruistic actors often benefit socially from their acts even 
if such benefits were not intentionally planned (Franco, Blau, & Zimbardo, 2011, 
p.104). Although both may benefit from their actions, heroes may create enemies 
by their actions that altruistic actors certainly do not (e.g., holding the door for 
your coworkers will not provoke retaliation, but standing up to an abusive boss on 
behalf of a coworker might). Those with heroic cognition, therefore, go beyond 
altruism, in their willingness to accept such sacrifices.  
Self-Efficacy. Heroic actors in organizational contexts are often faced 
with ethical dilemmas that require courageous and, sometimes, rapid action.  The 
timescale of action in organizational contexts, however, is not as extreme as it is 
for heroic actors in action teams or military contexts where the actor must make a 
split-second decision in a matter of a few seconds (Franco, Blau, & Zimbardo, 
2011). Organizational members that are presented with ethical challenges, 
therefore, have more time to plan their actions and to consider possible outcomes. 
During the evaluation period of challenging organizational stimuli, organizational 
members considering action must assess how capable they themselves are of 
achieving the goal of resolving organizational problems.  
12 
  Social-Cognitive Theory suggests that organizational members who have 
specific self-efficacy in the domain of heroic action are more likely to act when 
they encounter ethical challenges in the organizations for which they work.  Self-
efficacy is defined as a critical piece of self-regulation of goal directed behavior, 
the outcome of triadic reciprocal causation (Bandura, 1977; Wood & Bandura, 
1989). Reciprocal determinism posits that individuals and their environments are 
both the determinants and determiners of each other (cause and the effect in 
constant flux).  We behave as a result of a bidirectional, simultaneous interaction 
between personal factors (e.g., traits, such as personality, and states, such as 
mood), and environmental factors (e.g., work environmental influences, such as 
organizational climate). An organizational member faced with a challenge that 
requires heroic action, therefore, must have heroic specific self-efficacy, a belief 
in her/his ability to successfully resolve organizational issues that are in conflict 
with her/his value system. If individuals considering action have themselves 
achieved success in the past when engaging ethical dilemmas, they also will be 
more likely to choose to challenge future ethical dilemmas. 
 
Applying Heroic Cognition to Workplace Contexts 
Whether or not heroic cognition proves to be empirically distinct, 
predicting relevant criteria over and above other correlated predictors, there are 
numerous veins of research in the literature that suggest heroic cognition may be a 
relevant factor. Specifically, heroic cognition may predict organizational 
deviance, organizational members working outside the established structures of 
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bureaucracy in response to perceived organizational problems or breaches to 
ethics (Warren, 2003). Deviance may manifest itself as pro-social and 
constructive or anti-social and destructive.  
Recently, it has been suggested that the manifestation of deviance as 
positive or destructive can be framed as a choice paradigm for proactive 
individuals (Warren, 2003). In this way, both positive and destructive deviance 
may be considered as anchors on either end of a spectrum of possible behavioral 
outcomes in response to unethical or ineffective organizational practices, each of 
which is subject to similar antecedents and cognitive mechanisms. 
Deviance is best understood by considering the role of group normative 
control. Organizational policies (ethical or unethical), and the members that act 
according or counter to them, result in the formation of organizational norms. 
Group norms are de facto social rules that generally characterize and govern 
group member behavior (Hackman, 1976; Feldman, 1984). Norms arise from 
policies and statements made by managers and peers, precedents set by historical 
events, initial behaviors demonstrated at group formation, and other norms 
brought in by new members who were not originally part of the group.  
These informal social rules generally develop quickly and are maintained 
and propagated because they serve a variety of essential functions for the group, 
including ensuring group survival, expediting social exchanges by defining 
desirable behaviors, delimiting behaviors that might be injurious to the group’s 
goals or its members, and classifying central markers that define a group’s 
identity (Feldman, 1984). As normative control of group member behavior is 
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essential to maintaining group identity and function, it is likely that the efforts of 
proactive individuals in organizations may generally be better received by the 
groups in which they operate if they conform to established norms. Because 
norms play key roles in group identity and survival, it is not surprising that the 
literature has generally condemned the negative influence of group members who 
deviate from organizational norms, regardless of positive or destructive intent. 
Destructive deviance. The literature has formally recognized deviant 
workplace behaviors, volitional actions that violate the social norms of an 
organization, for some time (Robinson & Bennett, 1995; Bordia, Restubog, & 
Tang, 2008). Deviant behavior at work can be identified by three central 
characteristics: it is done intentionally, it violates formal social expectations, and 
it is directed either at the organization as a whole (organizational deviance) or at 
members within it (interpersonal deviance) (Robinson & Bennett, 1995). 
Deviance is traditionally seen in the literature as revenge behaviors that 
employees may engage in because they are motivated by a negative affective 
state, due to psychological contract breach (Bordia, Restubog, & Tang, 2008), and 
perceptions of injustice (Robinson & Bennett, 1997). Such behaviors have 
received significant empirical attention primarily because they may cause 
organizational or interpersonal harm (Bensimon, 1995; Bennett & Robinson, 
2000; Burroughs, 2001).  
Positive/constructive deviance. Few would argue that harmful revenge is 
a productive response to negative affect and cognitions in the workplace, but there 
is evidence to suggest that revenge alone does not sufficiently represent the full 
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spectrum of workplace deviance. Destructive deviance is only one part of the two-
sided deviance literature (Warren, 2003). A second vein of deviance literature 
suggests that deviant organizational behavior, when properly executed, may be 
responsible for desirable organizational and broader societal outcomes.  
Constructive/positive deviance (Spreitzer & Sonenshein, 2004) has been 
studied under a variety of operationalizations, including, among others, whistle-
blowing (Near & Miceli, 1995; Gundlach, Douglas, & Martinko, 2003), 
workplace voice (Klass, Olson-Buchanon, & Ward, 2012), organizational 
expedience (McLean Parks, Ma, & Gallagher, 2010), felt responsibility for 
constructive change (Fuller, Marler & Hester, 2006), minority dissent (De Dreu & 
West, 2001), and pro-social rule breaking (Morrison, 2006). Organizations would 
far prefer individuals to react to negative cognitive states and perceptions of 
psychological contract breach with constructive, rather than destructive, intent 
and behaviors. 
Broadly, the argument for how constructive deviance occurs can be 
described within the framework of the Theory of Planned Behavior. Individuals 
who perceive themselves to be heroic may be more likely to intend to behave 
heroically and to actually engage in heroic action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). 
Phrased differently, heroic attitudes and beliefs about the self, arising from 
behavioral, normative, and control beliefs towards one’s capacity for heroic action 
in a particular context (Ajzen, 2012), may predict heroic intentions and, 
ultimately, heroic behaviors. The decision-making pathway for heroic action, 
therefore, likely begins with heroic behavior intentionality. Contextual factors 
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within an organizational situation will moderate the expression of heroic 
behavior, but foundational heroic intentions may still be of use and import 
(Franco, Blau, & Zimbardo, 2011). However, neither a formal established 
pathway for heroic-decision making, nor the process for the development of 
heroic cognitions about the self exists in the literature. Furthermore, establishing 
such pathways is beyond the scope of this research. The present research seeks 
only provide organizations and researchers with a measure that can be used to 
assess individuals’ self-efficacy to act heroically, acceptance of self-sacrificial 
consequences, awareness of contexts that require heroic action, and 
acknowledgment of barriers they may encounter. Coupled with extant models of 
organizational citizenship behaviors, a scale of heroic cognition could provide 
applied utility to help reduce destructive deviance and increase courageous self-
sacrificial behaviors that enhance organizational and social value, and provide a 
basis for more research on heroic decision-making. 
 
Rationale 
Organizational policies and members can sometimes be unjust, unethical, 
immoral, and harmful. For those members who encounter such problematic 
systems and behaviors, the choice must be made to either engage in remedial 
action or not, and, if so, to meet perceived problems with heroic self-sacrifice or 
destructive deviance. Understanding and fostering heroic cognition in 
organizational members may be one method of encouraging pro-social OCB’s, 
but empirical measurement of the construct is required before its criterion-related 
validity can be established in organizational contexts. 
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The proposed research answers the call (Franco, Blau, & Zimbardo, 2011) 
to better understand the construct of heroic cognition. Organizational members 
who are prepared to act heroically when situational demands require courage 
behaviors may be more likely to act pro-socially than destructively. To-date, no 
such measure of heroic cognition exists in the published literature. The primary 
goal of the proposed research, therefore, is the creation and initial validation of a 
scale of heroic cognition. 
Research Question 
Research Question I. What is the underlying dimensionality of heroic cognition in 
workplace contexts?  
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Method 
Research Participants 
 Participants were introductory psychology course students from a large 
university in the Midwest region of the United States of America (nobserved = 251). 
The target sample size to attain a minimum number of participants for factor 
analysis of the 40-item heroic cognition scale was 200 participants (target 
minimum n/k ratio = 5:1; Nminimum = 200 participants; Shultz & Whitney, 2005, 
p.314).  
The participants were predominately female (68%) with a lesser 
representation of males (32%). The mean age of participants was 20.18 years (SD 
= 3.54 years), and ages ranged from 18 to 47 years. The racial composition of the 
sample was mostly white (54%) or Latino/Hispanic (21%). Participants specifying 
that they were of black, South Asian, East Asian, Middle Eastern, or Native 
American descent composed less than 10% of the sample each.  Most participants 
were of Catholic (42%) or other Christian (27%) religions, with a notable 
minority of Agnostics (12%). Participants specifying that they were of Jewish, 
Buddhist, Hindu, Muslim, or Atheist religions composed less than 10% of the 
sample each.   
Development of the Heroic Cognition Scale 
In accordance with widely-accepted recommendations for scale creation 
(Hinkin, 1998), development of the heroic cognition scale proceeded through 
several steps. These steps included item generation for the heroic cognition scale, 
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questionnaire administration to an initial set of participants, exploratory factor 
analysis, and content validation with a jury of subject matter experts.    
Items for the heroic cognition scale were generated by a deductive method 
based on prior content validation efforts in the literature (Franco, Blau, & 
Zimbardo, 2011). Heroic cognition has been conceived of as (1) Specific self-
efficacy in one’s ability to achieve pro-social goals in a particular situational 
context, (2) Conscious awareness of the situations that should compel one to take 
action for an ethical cause and the situations that should not (recognition of 
boundary conditions), (3) Acknowledgment of barriers to success should action 
be chosen, and (4) The courageous acceptance of personal sacrifices that may 
result if action is taken (Fraco, Blau, & Zimbardo, 2011).  
Because the heroic cognition scale was intended for use in applied 
organizational settings, functional brevity was desired if scale reliability was not 
greatly negatively impacted (Shultz & Whitney, 2005, p.55-56). Given the 
specified dimensions of heroic cognition theorized, ten items were created for 
each, for a total of forty initial items before factor analysis and content validation 
item reduction (Appendix A). This method was estimated to result in a final scale 
containing one-third to one-quarter the number of initial items (DeVellis, 1991). 
Scale were written using a closed-ended, Likert-type response scale format (1 = 
Strongly Disagree to 5 = Strongly Agree), as this approach has been used to 
successful effect in related altruism research (Rushton, Chrisjohn, & Fekken, 
1981). Qualtrics software was used to upload the heroic cognition scale items and 
a set of demographic questions to the internet, where introductory psychology 
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course students from a large university in the Midwest region of the United States 
of America were permitted to answer the questions in their own time from any 
remote location.  
Although there was some theoretical basis to expect a four-factor structure 
of the heroic cognition construct, there was no prior empirical evidence to 
confirm it. Principal axis factoring was, therefore, used to explore the underlying 
theoretical factor structure of the heroic cognition construct (Fabrigar, Wegener, 
MacCallum, & Strahan, 1999).  
A panel of academic psychologists was assembled to critically examine 
the content validity of the heroic cognitions scale obtained from exploratory 
factor analysis. The panel contained six social psychology graduate school 
students pursuing either a master’s or doctoral degree, and two experienced social 
psychology faculty members with doctoral degrees (npanel = 8). Social psychology 
experts were chosen because the heroic cognition theory literature is rooted in the 
social psychological tradition.  
A content validity ratio (CVR) methodology was used to formally assess 
the content validity of the scale (Lawshe, 1975). CVRs provide quantified 
evidence of whether or not scale items are considered by subject matter experts to 
be essential measures of a proposed construct. Panel members were given a list of 
all items retained after principal axis factoring and item reduction, and asked to 
rate the criticality of the items in measuring, specifically and respectively, the 
heroic self-efficacy, acceptance of self-sacrifice, and awareness of contextual 
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constraints dimensions on a three-point scale (1 = not necessary, 2 = useful, 3 = 
essential).  
The content validity ratio for each item was calculated according to 
Lawshe’s (1975) formula for CVRs from the validation panel ratings obtained. 
This formula is, in essence a ratio of the total number of SMEs providing ratings 
subtracted from the number of SMEs rating an item as essential, divided by the 
total number of raters (i.e., [(nessential-(Ntotal/2))/(Ntotal/2)]). Each CVR calculated 
was compared to the critical values table in the literature for minimum needed 
ratios corresponding with the size of the validation panel (Lawshe, 1975).  Items 
that fail to meet critical CVR values are, by the CVR method alone, considered to 
be poor measures of a construct. Panel members were also asked to provide 
qualitative feedback for the usefulness and face validity each item. Content 
validation results were compared with factor analysis results, such that CVR 
values, panel member commentary, and EFA extraction results were all 
considered simultaneously in establishing the preliminary validity of the heroic 
cognition scale. 
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Results 
Exploratory Factor Analysis and Scale Internal Reliability 
The factor structure of the 40-item Self-Report Heroic Cognitions scale 
(Appendix A) was assessed using principal axis factoring for exploratory factor 
analysis (Fabrigar, Wegener, MacCallum, & Strahan, 1999). Promax rotation was 
used because factor intercorrelations within each factor solution explored were 
greater than 0.20 (Hendrickson & White, 1964) (Table 1). Examination of the 
scree plot and eignevalues suggested several possible factor solutions (Figure 1). 
Several iterations of principal axis factoring were, therefore, performed, 
specifying two, three, four, or five factors. Within each iteration, items in the 
structure matrices produced by the various factor solutions were not retained in 
the factor structure if they had loadings less than 0.40 or cross-loadings greater 
than 0.40. Factor structure beyond a four-factor solution was difficult to interpret. 
Solutions of two and three factors resulted in factors containing items that 
spanned multiple theoretical boundaries. A four-factor solution was selected 
because it minimized these issues. 
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Figure 1. Scree plot of principal axis factoring extraction with promax rotation. A 
four factor solution was chosen based upon a combination of the scree plot, 
eignevalues observed, proportion of variance accounted for, interpretability of 
factor loadings, and alignment with heroic cognition theory. 
 
 
 
In the four factor solution, evidence of common factors and favorable 
partial correlations among the items was observed (KMO = .82). Bartlett’s test of 
sphericity led to a rejection of the null hypothesis that the item correlation matrix 
Table 1
Heroic Cognition: Retained Factor Means, Standard Deviations, Reliabilities, and Interrcorrelations
Factor
M SD
Eigenvalue                     
(% variance acct. for) 1 2 3
1. Heroic Self-Efficacy 3.55 0.55 6.52 (16.75%) (0.76)
2. Acceptance of Self-Sacrifice 3.25 0.28 1.70   (4.35%) 0.55 (0.61)
3. Awareness of Contexts 3.54 0.06 1.39   (3.57%) 0.34 0.45 (0.38)
Note. Factor reliabilities are in the diagonal of the correlation portion of the table. Factor scores were the 
mean of retained items within each dimension.
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was an identity matrix, χ2 (741, N = 251) = 2491.20, p < .001. Twenty-one items 
were retained after item reduction criteria were applied. However, item loadings 
within the four-factor structure produced unexpected results. 
Only 27.5% of items loaded onto the factors anticipated by deductive item 
generation from existing theory on heroic cognitions. All reverse-coded items 
loaded onto one factor, regardless of the intended theoretical content of the items. 
Reasons for this can only be speculated. An exploratory descriptive statistics 
analysis of the mean scores of reverse-coded items suggested that item means for 
reverse-coded items did not differ on average by more than approximately 0.10-
0.30 scale points (scale of 1-to-5 points) from other similar items, and a 
participant-by-participant analysis suggested that most participants detected the 
negative wording of these items. However, the mean differences were likely 
enough to cause the pattern of reverse-coded items to be extracted as an 
independent factor. After removing the fourth factor containing only reverse-
coded items, 14 items remained. Of the remaining 14 items, 8 items loaded onto 
the first factor, 3 items loaded onto the second, and 3 items loaded onto the third.  
 The first factor, containing 8 items, was labeled heroic self-efficacy 
because it reflected self-reported belief in one’s ability to engage in heroic action 
(eigenvalue = 6.52; 16.75% of the variance). Items included, “I am completely 
confident that I have the ability to make a radical positive change in this world for 
the benefit of others” (α = .76).  The second factor, composed of 3 items, was 
labeled acceptance of self-sacrifice because it reflected a willingness to be self-
sacrificial for others’ well-being (eigenvalue = 1.70; 4.35% of the variance). Items 
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included, “I would rather sacrifice my most treasured dream for my own life than 
fail to act on behalf of others in need” (α = .61). The third factor, containing 3 
items, was labeled awareness of contextual constraints because it reflected 
acknowledgment of external forces that would impact one’s efforts to affect 
outcomes of their heroic action (eigenvalue = 1.39; 3.57% of the variance). Items 
included, “I would not be able to govern all of the outcomes of my attempts to 
confront wrongdoing at my workplace” (α = .38). Given the low number of items 
on factors two and three, and that the content of the items within the respective 
subscales asked about varied contexts that may be likely to produce variability in 
responses (Appendix A), it was perhaps unsurprising that subscale reliabilities 
were as low as observed. Because internal consistency of the third factor was 
poor, the third factor was eliminated from further analyses. The final solution 
included two factors and 11 items (Table 2).  
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Table 2 
Items of the Heroic Cognition Scale Retained After PAF and Reliability Analysis 
Subscale 
  
Item 
     Heroic self-efficacy   
  
I think of myself as a courageous person of action. 
   
 
When I hear stories in the news of people doing 
heroic things, I firmly believe that I could do them 
too if I were ever in the same situation. 
 
   
I know how to successfully confront people who 
are more powerful than I am when their abuse of 
authority is harmful to others. 
 
   
I am completely confident that I have the ability to 
make a radical positive change in this world for the 
benefit of others. 
 
   
If I saw my boss doing something illegal, I would 
have the courage to report my boss to the proper 
authorities. 
 
   
Even as an employee with a low-level position, I 
could make my voice heard if I witnessed 
wrongdoing around me on the job. 
 
   
I know that I must occasionally do something bold 
on behalf of others to make a positive difference at 
my workplace. 
 
   
Nothing can get between me and my goals of 
achieving a more ethical workplace.  
Acceptance of 
self-sacrifice 
        
  
I would rather risk my own life for others’ benefit 
than to live a safe life for only myself. 
 
   
I would rather sacrifice my most treasured dream 
for my own life than fail to act on behalf of others 
in dire need. 
 
   
My actions at work demonstrate that I am 
concerned for others more than I am for myself.       
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Content Validity 
 A panel of SMEs rated the criticality of items for the heroic self-efficacy, 
acceptance of self-sacrifice, and awareness of contextual constraints factors. 
Because the panel contained eight SMEs, the critical CVR cutoff value for an 
item to be considered essential was 0.75 (Lawshe, 1975). All items failed to reach 
a sufficient CVR to support the content validity of the heroic cognitions scale 
(range of obtained CVRs: -1.00 to 0.25).  Alone, the CVRs obtained indicated that 
SMEs did not think any of the scale items across the factors were sufficient 
measures of their stated constructs. The scale also generated considerable 
contentious discussion among the panel members, and the construct of heroic 
cognition was debated at length. Because content validation had failed, the panel 
was asked to provide additional perspectives regarding why items were judged to 
be poor measures of the heroic cognitions construct. Panel members cited several 
concerns.  
The items were considered to have been too comprehensive and lengthy, 
effectively providing participants who responded to the survey with definitions of 
the entire heroism construct. Panel members indicated that item wording, 
therefore, made items difficult to answer and responses difficult to interpret. The 
item content of several items was also directly questioned. Panel members 
indicated that some items may be measuring other constructs in addition to or 
instead of heroism. Example items in question included, “I think of myself as a 
courageous person of action” and “Nothing can get between me and my goals of 
achieving a more ethical workplace,” which were judged by panel members to 
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measure, at least in part, narcissism. For these example items that were judged to 
measure narcissism, panel members argued compellingly that making strong 
statements about the self as a courageous person who cannot fail in their efforts in 
these contexts may measure heroic cognitions in part, but also measure self-
admiration, entitlement, and/or arrogance. Lastly, panel members expressed 
concern that the study design of attempting to measure self-reported heroic 
cognitions directly was too overt and likely subject to response bias for social 
desirability. Ultimately, the validation panel advised either alternative research 
methodologies for more subtle examination of the heroism construct, or a 
narrower study of subcomponents of the cognitive processes involved in heroic 
decision-making. 
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Discussion 
Major Findings and Implications 
 Research on heroism in the literature is growing. Recent research efforts 
have sought to propagate the belief that, with conscious self-awareness, all 
individuals are capable of a common sort of everyday heroism that transcends 
social contexts and some individual characteristics (Blau, Franco, & Zimbardo, 
2009; Franco, Blau, & Zimbardo, 2011; Zimbardo, Breckenridge, & Moghaddam, 
2013; Zimbardo & Wang, 2011). However, the thought process in which people 
engage to determine whether or not to act heroically has not yet been addressed in 
the literature with an empirical approach to the measurement of heroic cognition.  
Establishing a decision-making pathway to engage in heroic action is 
beyond the scope of this research. Nevertheless, justification for why the present 
research sought to create a scale of heroic cognition assessing behavioral 
intentionality as a valid approach to furthering research efforts in this field is 
warranted. Broadly, intentions are one aspect of a potential pathway for heroic 
decision making. The theory of planned behavior (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) 
suggests that heroic self-perceptions and pro-heroic attitudes in situ arise from 
behavioral, normative, and control beliefs towards one’s capacity for heroic action 
within a particular context (Ajzen, 2012). These self-perceptions may be 
preliminary elements in a reasoned action approach to the decision-making 
pathway to engage in heroism. Although intentionality alone is unlikely to be 
deterministic, such fundamental self-perceptions may be precursors to action, 
even in the presence of contextual constraints. These cognitions are likely to have 
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pragmatic utility for modern organizations. The author concedes that this 
measurement approach is limited (e.g., Norman, Sheeran, & Orbell, 2003), but it 
is perhaps useful given the preliminary nature of research efforts studying 
heroism. Future research may benefit from operationalizing heroism in diverse 
ways.  
Beyond rationale for why the chosen measurement approach was selected, 
there is also a gap in related organizational literature on the construct. To-date, 
application of the heroism construct to modern workplace contexts that are 
fraught with potential to engage in heroic action has not necessarily been explicit. 
Rather, the organizational literature contains primarily assessments of only related 
constructs characterized broadly under the umbrella of a group of special 
organizational citizenship behaviors (Organ, 1988) known broadly as 
constructive/pro-social deviance (Spreitzer & Sonenshein, 2004).  
The present research, therefore, attempted to deductively develop a 
pioneering measure of heroic cognition from heroism theory for use in workplace 
contexts (Franco, Blau, & Zimbardo, 2011).  Results from exploratory factor 
analysis of the heroic cognition scale indicated that heroic self-efficacy and 
acceptance of self-sacrifice appear to be the most promising dimensions of 
heroism for further measurement development in future heroic cognition research 
(Table 1). These two factors emerged from exploratory factor analysis with the 
strongest and most simply-structured item factor loadings, accounted for the most 
variance of extracted factors, and exhibited the highest internal consistency of 
measurement (Table 2).  
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It is notable, however, that content validation results were, in some ways, 
contradictory to the emergence of factors in EFA. A discussion of why 
discrepancies may have existed is given in more detail in the following pages. 
Overall, more weight was placed on the content validation panel’s critiques, as 
such critiques offered insights into the shortcomings of the measure that the 
author believes must be addressed in a revised approach to measurement. Given 
their critical nature, pre-eminent reliance on the content validation responses is 
also a more conservative approach to further developing the literature on heroism, 
which is likely to produce higher-quality research efforts. 
Heroic self-efficacy, one’s belief in one’s ability to engage in heroic 
action, emerged as the strongest factor with the greatest number of items and 
accounted for three-to-four times more variance than other factors. This indicates 
that individuals found the heroic self-efficacy items on the heroic cognition scale 
to be most salient and answered them most cohesively, yielding the most 
favorable pattern of partial correlations observed among items within that factor.  
Drawing upon the broader and extensive literature on Self-Efficacy Theory 
(Bandura, 1977), the emergence of this factor may suggest that one’s efficacious 
beliefs about one’s ability to be heroic are critical to one’s heroic self-concept.  
Although the factor emerged with strong factor loadings and moderate 
internal reliability, content validation for the heroic self-efficacy items failed. 
These results are inconsistent and reasons concerning why are only speculative. 
Nevertheless, the comments provided by the content validation panel provide 
some insights concerning how this paradox occurred. Validation panel SMEs 
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indicated that items were too comprehensive, lengthy, and potentially confounded 
with elements of anti-social trait measures, simultaneously providing participants 
who responded to the survey with definitions of the entire heroism construct and a 
consistent assessment of self-admiration, entitlement, and/or arrogance. This 
observation was perhaps especially true for heroic self-efficacy items (Appendix 
A). Participants, therefore, may have interpreted the items as a cohesive block of 
measures assessing one central construct, which yielded a favorable factor 
statistically. The content of those items in the emergent factor, however, does not 
reflect the intended construct of heroic self-efficacy alone. This explanation 
accounts for the apparent discrepancy between successful emergence of a heroic 
self-efficacy factor, but unsuccessful content validation. 
A search of the literature for heroic self-efficacy specifically yielded no 
direct prior empirical exploration of the construct. Related organizational 
psychology literature exploring change-oriented organizational citizenship 
behaviors (OCBs) suggests that the decision-making process to act may be 
complex and contextual.  In a structural equation model of change-oriented 
OCBs, role-breadth self-efficacy was an important predictor of taking action, but 
felt-responsibility for constructive change was an even stronger predictor (López-
Domínguez, Enache, Sallan, & Simo, 2013).  Both role-breadth self-efficacy and 
felt responsibility for constructive change were also preceded in the path by 
contextual factors, such as developmental leadership, an innovative climate, and 
resource availability. These results indicate that the decision to engage in pro-
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social organizational action is contingent upon context, climate, emotional 
cognition, values, and perceived competence in one’s job role.  
There is also evidence that change-oriented OCBs are contingent upon 
psychological empowerment (Choi, 2007) and an individual’s identification with 
his/her work unit (Seppala, Lipponen, Bardi, & Pirttila-Backman, 2012). 
Applying these findings to the operationalization of heroic cognition in this 
research, heroic self-efficacy alone is unlikely to be deterministic. Although 
organizational contexts requiring heroic action are more extreme and require self-
sacrifice in ways that exceed the demands of many other change-oriented OCBs, 
the effect of heroic self-efficacy on taking organizational action is likely also 
dependent upon similar factors. 
Concerning the second factor, it was not surprising that acceptance of self-
sacrifice emerged as a key component of the heroic cognition construct because 
self-sacrifice has been consistently identified in the literature as a critical 
dimension of heroic action (e.g., Becker & Eagley, 2004; Franco, Blau, & 
Zimbardo, 2011; Rankin & Eagley, 2008). This research may suggest further 
evidence that individuals recognize the role of self-sacrifice in the heroic 
decision-making process. However, the extent to which acceptance of self-
sacrifice is unique to the heroism construct and goes beyond that of altruism 
(Rushton, Chrisjohn, & Fekken, 1981) remains unclear.  
Furthermore, although the factor emerged, internal reliability was notably 
poor and only three items loaded successfully onto the factor. Given the wide 
array of contexts assessed in the items hypothesized to load onto acceptance of 
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self-sacrifice (Appendix A), the author argues that the scale produced such varied 
responses that cleaner pattern loadings on the factor and consistency of 
individuals’ responses across items within the factor were elusive. This may also 
help to explain why none of the SME ratings for the self-sacrifice items indicated 
items were essential. In summary, poor factor psychometrics and lack of support 
by SMEs are congruent results that both suggest future efforts might seek to more 
narrowly define contexts in the items for this factor. 
Several works have debated this issue. Earlier arguments on the subject 
specified that courageous resistance, a subset of altruistic behavior and congruent 
with the definition of heroism used in the present research, is distinct from 
altruistic and bystander intervention behaviors because courageous resistance is 
more continual, risky, and premeditated (Shepela et al., 1999).  Similarly, civil 
courage, brave reactive behaviors that seek to demonstrate discontentment to 
formal authority about policies or events, requires greater responsibility, more 
empathy, and is less likely to lead to universally-desirable outcomes than simple 
helping behaviors (Greitemeyer, Fischer, Kastenmüller, & Frey, 2006). Most 
recently, it has been argued that heroic action is more self-sacrificial, and that 
heroic actors choose to behave heroically with knowledge of the likely risks and 
without thought of tangible benefits to the self (Franco, Blau, & Zimbardo, 2011).   
Although the emergence of self-sacrifice as a dimension of heroic 
cognition is, therefore, congruent across related literatures, there is contentious 
debate surrounding motives for self-sacrificial action. Some have argued that self-
sacrificial behavior is only engaged in when the sacrifice is made on behalf of kin 
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(Hamilton, 1964), when the actor expects reciprocity from those for whom the 
behavior was chosen (Trivers, 1971), or as a “costly signal” to draw attention to 
one’s favorable traits (McAndrew & Perilloux, 2012; Zahavi, 1977). Additionally, 
most people endorse the ideal that self-sacrifice, even to the point of death, is an 
admirable choice; yet, when they are presented with hypothetical scenarios that 
would require them to sacrifice their lives for others, people are far more likely to 
say they would lay down their life for others in a group to which they feel 
affiliated or “fused” than for strangers (Swann et al, 2014). In contrast, others 
have argued that self-sacrificial decisions are made without thought of benefits to 
the self except to confirm one’s morality and beliefs in the preeminence of virtue, 
even when action is taken on behalf of others who have wronged the self-
sacrificial actor in the past (Turillo Folger, Lavelle, Umphress, & Gee, 2002).  
There are contrasting arguments for why people engage in self-sacrificial 
behaviors, but this author favors the argument that self-sacrifice is undertaken to 
affirm and remain congruent with one’s morality. Such an argument is also 
congruent with the theory of heroism that self-sacrifice is undertaken on behalf of 
others with no thought of external gain (Franco, Blau, & Zimbardo, 2011). 
Nevertheless, expectations of reciprocity, intending to signal virtuosity to upper 
level management with the hopes of signaling one’s readiness for promotion, or 
acting only on behalf of one’s work unit to which one feels intensely affiliated  
(not necessarily for the benefit of all) may also explain some outwardly pro-social 
OCBs. Whether or not OCBs that arise from more selfish motives can still be 
categorized as “heroic” is primarily subject to rhetorical debate, an issue beyond 
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the scope of this work. Ultimately within the scope of this research, the author 
encourages further exploration of the unique role of acceptance of self-sacrifice in 
predictive models of self-sacrificial organizational action. 
The other two emergent factors from factor analysis in this research were 
less promising. The third factor, awareness of contextual constraints, was not 
reliably measurable, and accounted for only a very small amount of the variance. 
Furthermore, it contained only 3 items, two of which were originally written for 
what was anticipated to be a fourth factor (acknowledgment of barriers to 
success). Reviewing the content of the acknowledgment of barriers to success 
items suggests that participants may have interpreted its items to be of a highly-
similar nature as the awareness of contextual constraints items (Appendix A). 
Contexts that should compel one to take action may inherently possess qualities 
that are indicative of barriers individuals might encounter in the choice to act 
heroically or not (Franco, Blau, & Zimbardo, 2011).  Although the awareness of 
contextual constraints factor was not usable due to low reliability (Table 1), future 
scale development efforts should consider the theoretical overlap of context and 
barriers.  
The fourth emergent factor contained only reverse-coded items and 
exhibited content from all four originally-anticipated factors. Heroism theory 
provided no explanation for this factor (Franco, Blau, & Zimbardo, 2011), as it 
appeared to provide no import beyond checking for data quality by comparing 
these item’s scores to scores on factors in other items to ensure that individuals 
were not answering at random. The literature confirms that the use of a mixture of 
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reverse coded items beyond this purpose may be ill-advised (Streiner & Norman, 
1995).  
Strengths, Limitations, and Future Directions  
 The study’s greatest strength was its reliance upon existing heroism theory 
in the literature. Items were deductively derived directly from existing discourse 
in the literature to create a heroic cognition scale for workplace contexts (Franco, 
Blau, & Zimbardo, 2011). The theoretical underpinnings of the scale were further 
enhanced by the potential relationships between heroism and existing constructs 
in the organizational literature (e.g., Organ, 1988; Spreitzer & Sonenshein, 2004; 
Warren, 2003). Given the prevalence of harmful organizational deviance in 
modern organizations (e.g., Henle, Giacalone, & Jurkiewicz, 2005; Robinson & 
Bennett, 1995), research exploring more constructive organizational members’ 
reactions to negative cognitive and emotional job states is timely. Additionally, 
the study benefited from statistical validity, as the dimensionality of the construct 
of heroic cognition was formally assessed via methods of exploratory factor 
analysis advised in the literature (Fabrigar, Wegener, MacCallum, & Strahan, 
1999).  
 There were, however, notable limitations to the study design. Although the 
author received some feedback from peers in the field in the item-writing stage of 
the research, formal content validation prior to any data collection and pilot-
testing may have been advisable. A thorough review of the literature was 
undertaken prior to item-writing (Broome, 2000), but pilot-testing (DeVellis, 
1991) was not done and content validation (Lawshe, 1975) was only completed 
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after data collection.  Having completed pilot-testing and content validation prior 
to data collection may have helped to circumvent item length and wording issues, 
and potential content confounds within the items identified by the SME rating 
panel. Completing this process at an earlier stage may also have revealed the most 
notable limitation of the study: directly assessing self-report heroic cognition may 
not be the best approach to studying the construct.  
Some aspects of the heroic cognition construct as defined in this research, 
including feeling efficacious in the ability to act heroically and acceptance of self-
sacrifice, may be useful predictors of heroic intentions and behaviors (Fishbein & 
Azjen, 1975). However, the direct measurement of self-perceptions of one’s own 
heroic attitudes and beliefs is likely subject to response bias that may limit the 
utility of the construct for organizational application. The experimental design of 
this research allowed individuals to respond anonymously to heroic cognition 
scale survey questions online from the privacy of any location they desired. 
Nevertheless, participants may have answered questions to match their 
perceptions of the most socially-desirable answers, rather than responding 
truthfully in accordance with their actual attitudes and beliefs (Paulhas, 1991; 
Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991). Future research on the heroic cognition construct 
should include measures to assess social desirability (e.g., Jacobson, Brown, & 
Ariza, 1983). 
Furthermore, the present research examined only self-perceptions of 
heroic cognition, not others’ perceptions of one’s capacity for heroic action. 
Although others’ perceptions of one’s heroic potential are likely to be subjective 
39 
and varied (Franco, Blau, & Zimbardo, 2011), a multi-rater methodology that 
assesses both self and others’ ratings may provide more compelling evidence of 
the construct validity of heroic cognition (Campbell & Fiske, 1959; Platt, 1964). 
Follow-up heroic cognition scale analyses were initially planned for a 
second set of data, as advised in the methodology literature (Hinkin, 1998), but 
exploratory factor analysis and content validation results did not mandate further 
testing.  Planned analyses in a second study included confirmatory factor analysis 
to verify scale dimensionality, a test-retest reliability analysis, and a predictive 
model of intentions to engage in heroic action to establish initial convergent, 
discriminant, divergent, and predictive validity of the heroic cognition scale. 
However, further scale development that is informed by the results observed is 
needed prior to follow-up scale validation.  
More specifically, the exploratory factor analysis results in the present 
research suggest that the two most promising heroic cognition dimensions for 
revision and development may be heroic self-efficacy and acceptance of self-
sacrifice. Follow-up scale development efforts might include additional pre-data 
collection qualitative methodologies, such as focus groups (Carry, 1994) or a 
phenomenological approach (Crabtree & Miller, 1992), to ensure that items 
capture sufficient breadth and depth of the two dimensions. It would also be 
advisable to simplify item wording and shorten item length to make the items 
more accessible to less-advanced levels of reading comprehension (Fry, 1977).  
The revised measures should then be tested with a separate second set of 
data (Hinkin, 1998). Ultimately, an organizationally-contextual predictive applied 
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model should be tested that includes other theoretically-related and distinct 
constructs to establish a nomological network (Landy, 1986) for initial 
convergent, discriminant, divergent, and predictive validity. Borrowing the 
methods from related change-oriented OCB research is a logical progression after 
scale revision and further exploratory factor analysis (e.g., López-Domínguez, 
Enache, Sallan, & Simo, 2013).  For example, a structural equation model 
including identification with work unit (Shepela et al, 1999), psychological 
empowerment (Choi, 2007), and felt responsibility for constructive change 
(Morrison & Phelps, 1999) as mediators in the predictive relationship between the 
antecedents of heroic self-efficacy and acceptance of self-sacrifice, and the 
outcome of organizational heroic action (measured via a hypothetical scenario), 
could provide clarity regarding the role of these heroic cognition dimensions in 
the organizational heroism decision-making pathway. Modeling contextual 
organizational factors may also reveal boundary effects of the motivational value 
of heroic self-efficacy and acceptance of self-sacrifice (Dutton & Ashford, 1993). 
Conclusion 
 The present research attempted to advance the growing but limited 
heroism literature by creating a multi-dimensional measure of heroic cognition 
that can be used to generate more empirical discourse on the study of heroic 
action in workplace contexts. Further scale development and refinement is needed 
prior to initial validation studies. It is notable that direct operationalization of the 
theorized dimensionality of heroic cognition (Franco, Blau, & Zimbardo, 2011) 
was not supported by much of the factor analysis results or any of the content 
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validation results in the present research. Because of the methodological 
limitations of the author’s work, it is unclear whether the failure to produce a 
factor structure specified in the literature is more attributable to lacking theory or 
researcher misspecification in operationalization of the theory. However, at least 
part of the proposed factor structure was supported. The emergence of heroic self-
efficacy and acceptance of self-sacrifice as key dimensions of heroic cognition 
indicates potential for further research using at least a portion of the framework 
here established. It is the firm opinion of the author that future integrative work 
that seeks to combine related literatures on civil courage, courageous resistance, 
constructive deviance, and heroism with change-oriented organizational 
citizenship behaviors has the potential to meaningfully impact both theory and 
practice in the organizational and broader social psychological literatures.  
  
42 
References 
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE). (2010). 2010 Report to the 
nations on occupational fraud and abuse. Austin, TX: ACFE. 
Ajzen, I. (2012). Martin Fishbein’s legacy: The reasoned action approach. Annals 
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 640(1), 11-27. 
Benforado, A. & Hanson, J.  (2012). Attributions and ideologies: Two divergent 
visions of human behavior behind our laws, policies, and theories. In 
Hanson, J. (Ed.), Ideology, psychology, and law (p 298- 337). New York, 
NY, US: Oxford University Press. 
Bennett, R. J., & Robinson, S. L. (2000). Development of a measure of workplace 
deviance. Journal of Applied Psychology, 85, 349–360. 
Bensimon, E. M. (1995). Total quality management in the academy: A rebellious 
reading. Harvard Educational Review, 65, 593-611. 
Boswell, W.R., Colvin, A.J.S., & Darnold, T.C. (2008). Organizational systems 
and employee motivation. (In K,C, & P). 
Burroughs, S.M. (2001). The role of dispositional aggressiveness and 
organizational injustice on deviant workplace behavior. Dissertation 
abstracts international. B. The sciences and engineering, 62, 4. 
Blau, K., Franco, Z.E., & Zimbardo, P.G. (2009). Fostering the heroic 
imagination: An ancient ideal and a modern vision. Retrieved from 
http://heroicimagination.org/2010/11/fostering-the-heroic-imagination/ 
Bordia, P., Restubog, S., &Tang, R.L. (2008). When employees strike back: 
Investigating mediating mechanisms between psychological contract 
43 
breach and workplace deviance. Journal of Applied Psychology, 93(5), 
1104-1117. 
Boswell, W.R., Colvin, A.J.S., & Darnold, T.C. (2008). Organizational systems 
and employee motivation. (In K,C, & P). 
Broome, M.E. (2000). Integrative literature reviews for the development of 
concepts. In B.L. Rodgers & Knafl (Eds.), Concept development in 
nursing: Foundations, techniques, and applications (2nd ed.). Philadelphia: 
W.B. Saunders. 
Bureau of Economic Analysis. (2013). National Income and Product Accounts; 
Gross Domestic Product, 4th quarter and annual 2012 (third estimate);   
Corporate Profits, 4th quarter and annual 2012. Retrieved from 
http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/gdpnewsrelease.htm 
Campbell, D.T., & Fiske, D.W. (1959). Convergent and discriminant validation 
by the multitrait-multimethod matrix. Psychological Bulletin, 56, 81-105. 
Carry, M.A. (1994). The group effect in focus groups: Planning, implementing, 
and interpreting focus group research. In J.M. Morse (Ed.), Critical issues 
in qualitative research methods (pp.225-241). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Cialdini, R. (2009). Influence: Science and practice (5th ed.). New York, NY: 
Pearson. 
Choi, J.N. (2007). Change-oriented organizational citizenship behavior: Effects of 
work environment characteristics and intervening psychological processes. 
Journal of Organizational Behavior, 28, 467–484. 
44 
Cooper, J. (2013).  On fraud, deceit and ethics.  Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 49(2), 314. 
Crabtree, B.F. & Miller, W.L. (Eds.). (1992). Doing qualitative research. 
Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
De Dreu, C. K. W., & West, M. A. (2001). Minority dissent and team innovation: 
The importance of participation in decision making. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 86, 1191–1201.  
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Limited. (2014). The Deloitte millennial survey 
[PowerPoint slides]. Retrieved from 
http://www.slideshare.net/slideshow/embed_code/30249317. 
DeVellis, R.F. (1991). Scale development: Theory and applications. Newbury 
Park, CA: Sage. 
Dutton, J. E., & Ashford, S. J. (1993). Selling issues to top management. Academy 
of Management Review, 18(3), 397–428. 
Eagly, A., & Becker, S. (2005). Comparing the heroism of women and men. 
American Psychologist, 60, 343–344. 
Enserink, M. (2010). Final report: Stapel affair points to bigger problems in social 
psychology. Science (online). Retrieved from 
 http://news.sciencemag.org/scienceinsider/2012/11/final-report-stapel-
affair-point.html 
Erikson, E.H. (1959). Identity and the life cycle. New York, NY: International 
Universities Press. 
45 
Fabrigar, L.R., Wegener, D.T., MacCallum, & Strahan, E.J. (1999). Evaluating 
the use of exploratory factor analysis in psychological research. 
Psychological Methods, 3, 272-299. 
Feldman, D.C. (1984). The development and enforcement of group norms. 
Academy of Management Review, 9(1), 47-53. 
Fishbein, M., & Ajzen, I. (1975). Belief, attitude, intention, and behavior: An 
introduction to theory and research. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
Franco, Z.E., Blau, K., & Zimbardo, P.G. (2011). Heroism: A conceptual analysis 
and differentiation between heroic action and altruism. Review of general 
psychology, 15(2), 99.  
Frese, M., & Fay, D. (2001). Personal initiative (PI): An active performance 
concept for work in the 21st century. Research in Organizational 
Behavior, 23, 133–187.   
Fry, E. (1977). Fry’s readability graph: Clarifications, validity, and extension to 
level 17. Journal of Reading, 21, 249. 
Galinsky, M.D., & Fast, I. (1966). Vocational choice as a focus of the identity 
search. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 13(1), 89-92. 
Greitemeyer, T., Fischer, P., Kastenmüller, A., & Frey, D. (2006). Civil courage 
and helping behavior: Differences and similarities. European 
Psychologist, 11(2). 90–98. 
Hendrickson, A. E., & White, P.O. (1964). Promax: A quick method for rotation 
to oblique simple structure. British Journal of Statistical Psychology, 17, 
65-70. 
46 
Henle, CA, Giacalone, RA, & Jurkiewicz, CL. (2005). The role of ethical 
ideology in workplace deviance. Journal of Business Ethics, 56(3), 219-
230. 
Henriques DB (2009) Madoff never made supposed investments. New York 
Times (online). Retrieved from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/21/business/21madoff.html 
Hinkin, T.R. (1995). A review of scale development practices in the study of 
organizations. Journal of Management, 21, 967-988. 
Hinkin, T.R. (1998). A brief tutorial on the development of measures for use in 
survey questionnaires. Organizational Research Methods, 1, 104-121. 
Hughes-Hallett, L. (2004). Heroes. London: HarperCollins. 
Jones, E.E., Harris, V.A. (1967). The attribution of attitudes. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 3(1), 1–24. 
Klaas, B.S., Olson-Buchanan, J. B., & Ward, A.K. (2012). The determinants of 
alternative forms of workplace voice an integrative perspective. Journal of 
Management, 38(1), 314-345. 
Landy, F.L. (1986). Stamp collecting versus science: Validation as hypothesis 
testing. American Psychologist, 41, 1183-1192. 
Lawshe, C.H. (1975). A quantitative approach to content validity. Personnel 
Psychology, 28, 563-575. 
Lefkowitz, J. (2005). The values of Industrial-Organizational Psychology: Who 
are we? The Industrial-Organizational Psychologist, 43(2), 13-20. 
47 
López-Domínguez, M., Enache, M., Sallan, J.M., & Simo, P. (2013). 
Transformational leadership as an antecedent of change-oriented 
organizational citizenship behavior. Journal of Business Research, 66, 
2147–2152. 
McAndrew, F. T. (2002). New evolutionary perspectives on altruism: multilevel-
selection and costly-signaling theories. Current Directions in 
Psychological Science, 11, 79-82. 
McLean Parks, J., Ma, L., & Gallagher, D. G. (2010). Elasticity in the “rules” of 
the game: Exploring organizational expedience. Human Relations, 63(5), 
701–730. 
Medin, DL. (1989). Concepts and conceptual structure. American Psychologist, 
44. 
Miceli, MP & Near, JP. (1985) Characteristics of organizational climate and 
perceived wrongdoing associated with whistle-blowing decisions Personnel 
Psychology 38(3), 525−544. 
Miceli MP, Near JP and Dworkin TM (2008). Whistle-blowing in Organizations. 
New York: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group. 
Miceli, MP, Near, JP, Rehg, MT & Van Scotter, JR. (2012). Predicting employee 
reactions to perceived organizational wrongdoing: Demoralization, justice, 
proactive personality, and whistle-blowing. Human Relations, 65(8), 923–
954. 
Milgram, S. (1974). Obedience to authority. New York, NY: Harper & Row 
48 
Milgram, S. (1992). The individual in a social world: Essays and experiments. J. 
Sabini & M. Silver (Ed.). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill. 
Morrison, E.W. (2006). Doing the job well: An investigation of pro-social rule 
breaking. Journal of Management, 32(1), 5. 
Morrison, E. W., & Phelps, C. C. (1999). Taking charge at work: Extrarole efforts 
to initiate workplace change. Academy of Management Journal, 42(4), 403–
419. 
Nader R, Petkas PJ, Blackwell K (Eds). (1972). Whistle-blowing: The report on 
the conference on professional responsibility. New York: Grossman. 
Near, J.P. & Miceli, M.P. (1995). Whistle-blowing: Myth and reality. Journal of 
Management, 22(3), 507-526. 
Neuroskeptic. (2012). The nine circles of scientific hell. Perspectives on 
Psychological Science, 7(6), 643-644. 
Organ, D.W. (1988). Organizational Citizenship behavior: The good soldier 
syndrome. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. 
Norman, P., Sheeran, P., & Orbell, S. (2003). Does state versus action orientation 
moderate the intention-behavior relationship? Journal of Applied Social 
Psychology, 33(3), 536-553. 
Parker, S.K., & Ohly, S. (2008). Designing motivating jobs: An expanded 
framework for linking work characteristics and motivation (In K,C, & P). 
Parker, S. K., & Sprigg, C. A. (1999). Minimizing strain and maximizing 
learning: The role of job demands, job control, and proactive personality. 
Journal of Applied Psychology, 84, 925–939. 
49 
Parker, S. K., Wall, T. D., & Jackson, P. R. (1997). “That’s not my job”: 
Developing flexible employee work orientations. Academy of 
Management Journal, 40, 899–929. 
Paulhus, D.L. (1991). Measurement and control of response biases. In J.P. 
Robinson et al. (Eds.), Measures of personality and social psychological 
attitudes. San Diego: Academic Press. 
Platt, J.R. (1964). Strong inference. Science, 146, 3642.  
Rankin, L.E., & Eagley, A.H. (2008). Is his heroism hailed and hers hidden? 
Women, men, and the social construction of heroism. Psychology of 
Women Quarterly, 32, 414–422. 
Robinson, S. & Bennett, R. (1995). A typology of deviant workplace behaviours: 
a multi-dimensional scaling study. Academy of Management Journal, 
38(2), 555-72. 
Rosenthal, R. & Rosnow, R.L. (1991). Essentials of behavioral research: 
Methods and data analysis (2nd ed.). Boston: McGraw-Hill. 
Ross, L. (1977). The intuitive psychologist and his shortcomings. In L. Berkowitz 
(Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 10, p 173-220). 
New York: Academic Press. 
Rushton, JP, Chrisjon, RD, & Fekken. GC. (1981). The altruistic personality and 
self-report altruism scale. Personality and Individual Differences, 2, 293-
302. 
Seppala, T,  Lipponen, J, Bardi, M, & Pirttila-Backman, A-M. (2012). Change-
oriented organizational citizenship behaviour: An interactive product of 
50 
openness to change values, work unit identification, and sense of power. 
Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology, 85, 136–155. 
Shepela, S. T., Cook, J., Horlitz, E., Leal, R., Luciano, S., Lutfy, E., & Warden, E. 
(1999). Courageous resistance. Theory & Psychology, 9, 787–805. 
Shultz, K.S. & Whitney, D.J. (2005). Measurement theory in action: Case studies 
and exercises. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Spreitzer, G. M., & Sonenshein, S. (2004). Toward a construct definition of 
positive deviance. The American Behavioral Scientist, 47, 828–847. 
Super, D. (1951). Vocational adjustment: Implementing a self-concept. Journal of 
Counseling & Development, 30, 88–92. 
Walker, L.J., Frimer, J.A., & Dunlop, W.L. (2012). The social psychology of 
morality: Exploring the causes of good and evil. Mikulincer, Mario (Ed.); 
Shaver, Phillip R. (Ed.). Washington, DC, US: American Psychological 
Association. 
Warren, DE. (2003). Constructive and destructive deviance in organizations. 
Academy of Management Review, 28(4), 622–632. 
Wood, R. & Bandura, A. (1989).  Social cognitive theory of organizational 
management. (In S,P&B). 
Zahavi, A. (1977). Reliability in communication systems and the evolution of 
altruism. In B. Stonehouse & C. M. Perrins (Eds.), Evolutionary ecology 
(pp. 253-259). London: Macmillan. 
Zimbardo, P. G. (2007). The Lucifer effect: Understanding how good people turn 
evil. New York: Random House. 
51 
Zimbardo, P.G., Breckenridge, J.N., & Moghaddam, F.M. (2013). “Exclusive” 
and “inclusive” visions of heroism and democracy. Current Psychology, 
32, 221–233. 
Zimbardo, P.G. & Wang, C.X. (2011). Resisting Influence. The Lucifer effect. 
Retrieved from http://www.lucifereffect.com/guide.htm 
  
52 
 
 
 
 
Appendix A 
Heroic Cognition Scale 
 
 
 
  
53 
The heroic cognition scale was developed for this research. It was conceptually 
derived from Franco, Blau & Zimbardo (2011), Zimbardo & Wang (2011), and 
Blau, Franco, & Zimbardo (2009). 
 
Heroic self-efficacy 
 
I would be able to stand up against unethical policies at my workplace. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree       Strongly Agree 
 
I think of myself as a courageous person of action. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
 
I am confident that I could confront my coworkers if I saw them doing something 
wrong. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
 
If I saw my boss doing something illegal, I would have the courage to report my 
boss to the proper authorities. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
 
I would feel powerless to confront unethical behaviors that I witnessed at work. 
REVERSE CODE 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
 
If coworkers behave unethically, I would have no power to confront them. 
REVERSE CODE 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
 
I could never stand up to injustice. REVERSE CODE 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
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If I saw a coworker committing fraud, I would be unable to stop them. REVERSE 
CODE 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
 
Even an employee with a low-level position can make their voice heard when 
they witness unethical behaviors on the job. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
 
I possess the ability to be heroic at work if I need to be. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
 
Acceptance of self-sacrifice 
 
I could sacrifice my job if doing so is the only way to achieve justice at my 
workplace. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
 
My actions at work would demonstrate that I am concerned for others more than I 
am for myself. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
 
I would be motivated to take action for my beliefs at work because I want to 
improve my position in life. REVERSE 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
 
I accept that I may need to make personal sacrifices at my job for the greater good 
of the organization. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
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I accept that I will need to make personal sacrifices at my job in order to help my 
coworkers achieve what they have rightfully earned. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
 
I would rather protect my own interests than take action for others. REVERSE 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
 
I would be prepared to accept being fired to stand up for an important cause at 
work. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
 
I would rather be considered an outcast at work than fail to confront unethical 
behaviors of my coworkers. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
 
As long as I was progressing towards my professional goals, I could accept 
workplace policies that I did not think were fair to others. REVERSE 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
 
I would not care that my workplace has unethical policies, as long as my career 
was not harmed by them. REVERSE 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
 
 
Awareness of contextual restraints  
 
Sometimes, I may feel the need to speak up at work, even if doing so might make 
my work life more difficult. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
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I would feel personally responsible to commit myself to an ethical cause at work 
if people might be at risk of harm from my employer. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
 
 
 
I know that I must occasionally do something bold on behalf of others to make a 
positive difference at my workplace. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
 
 
I should always take action against my employer for what I believe, even if doing 
so would make the jobs of my coworkers more difficult. REVERSE 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
 
I should only take a stand for what I believe at work if the situation would be 
likely to produce an outcome that is desirable for the organization as a whole. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
 
I should only take a stand for what I believe at work if the situation would be 
likely to produce an outcome that is desirable for my coworkers. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
 
I should only take a stand for what I believe at work if the situation would be 
likely to produce an outcome that is desirable for myself. REVERSE 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
 
Some situations might compel me to take a stand at work because my workplace 
would be a worse environment if I did not. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
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I would fight an organizational policy I did not agree with until I got my way, 
even if the policy was relatively unimportant. REVERSE 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
 
Policies at my workplace are only worth challenging if they are unethical. 
REVERSE 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
 
Acknowledgement of barriers to success  
 
I know that I would need a good strategy to overcome obstacles that would 
prevent me from achieving a good cause at my workplace. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
 
I would have to overcome barriers in order to take a successful stand for 
something I believe in at my job. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
 
If my coworkers were doing something unethical, they would try to prevent me 
from exposing them. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
 
I will not be able to govern all of the outcomes of my attempts to confront 
wrongdoing at my workplace. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
 
I have thought about things that might cause me to fail if I were to take a stand for 
something I believe in at my workplace. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
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Nothing can get between me and my goals of achieving a more ethical workplace. 
REVERSE 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
 
 
 
If my boss was doing something unethical, she or he would not try to prevent me 
from exposing her or him. REVERSE 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
 
I would likely have to adjust my strategy from time-to-time when confronting 
wrongdoing at my workplace. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
 
There would be forces of influence beyond my control that would impact how 
successful my attempts to expose wrongdoing at my workplace would be. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
 
There would likely be informal policies in place at my organization to punish 
people who “snitch” when they see coworkers doing something unethical. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
 
